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CALLED TO DUTY: JUSTICE WILLIAM J. 
GASTON* 
JUSTICE BARBARA A. JACKSON** 
This Article examines the jurisprudence of Justice William J. 
Gaston (1778–1844), a revered member of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina, who is best known for two opinions that 
furthered the rights of slaves. Previous scholars have written 
about Justice Gaston’s focus on the rights and humanity of 
slaves, but they have not looked deeply at Justice Gaston’s 
religious ideas and the support those ideas provided to his 
jurisprudence. Notably, Justice Gaston was Catholic during a 
time when there were very few Catholics and no cathedral in the 
state. This Article explores the extent to which Gaston’s Catholic 
faith informed his judicial decision making, as well as what to 
make of the apparent contradiction between his public position 
against slavery and his personal slave ownership. As such, this 
Article uses judicial biography to study in detail the interaction of 
religious and legal thought in a period of dramatic conflict. 
 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 2052 
I.    GASTON’S BACKGROUND ......................................................... 2056 
II.    EARLY CRITICISM OF GASTON’S CATHOLICISM ................... 2063 
III.    GASTON AND THE SUPREME COURT ...................................... 2066 
A.  Ruffin’s Slavery Jurisprudence: Entrenching 
Oppression in North Carolina’s Case Law ....................... 2066 
B.  Tempering Ruffin’s Harsh Treatment of Slaves: 
Gaston’s Slavery and Race-Related Jurisprudence .......... 2070 
 
 *  © 2016 Barbara A. Jackson. 
 **  Barbara A. Jackson, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of North Carolina; J.D. 
1990 University of North Carolina School of Law; L.L.M. 2014 Duke University School of 
Law. This Article is a revision of the thesis submitted for her LL.M. degree. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Professor Alfred Brophy, her thesis advisor, 
as well as her research assistants Jordan Fly and Jane Yumi Paksoy for their assistance in 
editing this Article. In addition, the author wishes to thank Danny Moody, then Chief of 
Protocol, Historian and Special Collections Librarian for the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, for providing the inspiration for this Article. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 2051 (2016) 
2052 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
1.  State v. Negro Will: Gaston Makes an Early 
Statement of Judicial Independence ........................... 2070 
2.  State v. Manuel: Gaston Reemphasizes the 
Protections Afforded to Freemen as Citizens ............ 2083 




In modern society, questions about the role of faith and religion 
as they relate to public life abound. Candidates for office are 
routinely grilled about their adherence—or lack thereof—to a 
particular religion. Their answers may either be genuine or carefully 
calculated to energize supporters or placate critics. Similarly, 
members of the judiciary are not immune from questions regarding 
their faith.1 
The pre-Civil War era was a period of extraordinary faith and 
interest in religion. Scholars of American religion have demonstrated 
the vitality and diversity of religious beliefs and practices before the 
Civil War.2 In particular, the Second Great Awakening of the 1830s 
saw religious enthusiasm grow as new religious sects, such as 
Mormons,3 began and as more established churches, such as Baptists, 
Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Methodists,4 expanded.5 Similarly, legal 
thought often borrowed from religious doctrine during this time. For 
example, revivalist Charles Grandison Finney, the person most 
associated with the Second Great Awakening, was a lawyer before he 
turned to religion.6 Finney was a prolific writer who relied upon his 
legal education in presenting the case for his theology, “the natural 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Michelle L. Jones, Note, Religiously Devout Judges: A Decision-Making 
Framework for Judicial Disqualification, 88 IND. L.J. 1089, 1089 (2013) (suggesting that 
judges’ religious beliefs sometimes may be cause for recusal or disqualification). 
 2.  See generally JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE (1990) (discussing the growth of denominational religions prior to the 
Civil War). 
 3.  Id. at 68–70, 242–47 (discussing the growth of Mormonism in the 1830s). 
 4.  Id. at 269–70. 
 5.  RICHARD J. CARWARDINE, EVANGELICALS AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA 1 (1993) (“[I]n the 1830s and 1840s, hundreds of thousands of new converts 
became full members of the Protestant churches. By mid-century evangelical 
Protestantism was the principal subculture in American society.”). 
 6.  Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power 
and Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 338 (2014) (characterizing 
Finney as a “recovering lawyer”). 
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basis for morality and moral government.”7 Because religious thought 
was so closely connected to the secular world, the controversies 
around this subject matter appeared frequently in law, from the 
selection of judges to their decisions. 
In addition to the important writing linking religious thought to 
legal thought in the pre-Civil War era,8 there is extensive literature 
that examines the conflicts—and correlations—between judges’ 
internal moral compasses and their judicial decisions. For example, 
Robert M. Cover’s book Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial 
Process describes how judges who were anti-slavery in private often 
manipulated their decisions to conform to a pro-slavery law.9 It 
appears that the law often allowed insufficient leeway for judges to 
insert their own views about slavery. Other research suggests that 
judges may have been less ardently anti-slavery than Cover suggests.10 
But important questions remain about just how much moral 
thought—theological moral thought in particular—correlated with 
judicial opinions.11 
 
 7.  Nelson P. Miller, The Nobility of the American Lawyer: The Ennobling History, 
Philosophy, and Morality of a Maligned Profession, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 209, 297 
(2005). 
 8.  See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional 
Protection of Private Property: 1760–1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 66 (1990) (arguing that 
religious ideas affected political outlooks in North America before and after the 
Revolutionary War). 
 9.  See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 119–23 (1975); Adam Shinar, Dissenting From Within: Why and How Public 
Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601, 607 n.21 (2013) (citing Cover for the 
proposition that “[p]erhaps the most extreme case of role conception is the willingness of 
antislavery judges to uphold fugitive slave laws”). Subsequent research has called into 
question some of Cover’s thesis. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Schmitt, The Antislavery Judge 
Reconsidered, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 797, 801–02 (2011) (discussing how a conventional 
account of the antislavery judge, such as Cover’s, ignores the importance of the Fugitive 
Slave Act and its vulnerability to legitimate constitution-backed legal attacks); James W. 
Ely Jr., Book Review, 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 265, 270 (1975) (reviewing ROBERT M. 
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975)) 
(discussing how Cover selectively ignored several primary sources about certain judges in 
his analysis and omitted analysis of other relevant judges altogether). 
 10.  Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slavery, 
and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086, 1147 (1993) (arguing that Justice 
Story’s “antislavery reputation” may not be accurate). 
 11.  This same dichotomy has been observed in North Carolina’s Justice Ruffin. See 
MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN 
HISTORY AND LITERATURE 38 (2003). Ruffin, who authored State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 
Dev.) 263 (1829), wrote in his letter of resignation, “I have administered the law as I 
understood it, and to the ends of suppressing crime and wrong, and upholding virtue, 
truth, and right.” TUSHNET, supra. 
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Another line of inquiry into pre-Civil War legal thought links 
judicial philosophy to political ideology. Inspired by work on political 
ideology in the Jacksonian period which demonstrated that 
Democrats differed in significant ways from Whigs (the forerunners 
of Republicans) on such issues as state power, property rights, and 
sometimes slavery, this literature finds that Democratic jurists 
employed different styles of reasoning from those who were Whigs.12 
Scholars delving into the nature of judicial thought in the pre-
Civil War period often turn to judicial biography to see how disparate 
elements of thought—from religious sentiment to economic and 
political ideology—fit together. Building on such pioneering studies 
as Richard Hofstadter’s The American Political Tradition13 and then 
G. Edward White’s The American Judicial Tradition,14 legal historians 
employed jurisprudential studies of individual judges with great 
effectiveness. Recently, for instance, Timothy Huebner’s The 
Southern Judicial Tradition studied a handful of southern judges in 
the nineteenth century to provide insight into the ways they were 
constrained by precedent and how they nonetheless changed the law 
to promote economic growth and evangelical Protestant ideas.15 This 
method of judicial biography yielded important insights for northern 
judges, too, as demonstrated by Kent Newmyer’s biography of Justice 
Joseph Story and Leonard Levy’s biography of Lemuel Shaw, Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.16 
This Article employs that well-tested approach to biographical 
study of a key North Carolina jurist, William J. Gaston. While studies 
of Gaston are not new to academic literature, he often serves as a foil 
 
 12.  See LAWRENCE FREDERICK KOHL, THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES 
AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 145–85 (1989) (explaining 
how Democrats and Whigs took different approaches to the rule of law). See generally G. 
EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835 (1988) 
(discussing the development of the Supreme Court at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century). 
 13.  See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 
AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1948) (looking at the lives of numerous leading politicians 
in American history, from the Founding Fathers through Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
 14.  See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (3d 
ed. 2007) (profiling leading judges of the nineteenth century). 
 15.  See generally TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: 
STATE JUDGES AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790–1890 (1999) (recounting the 
histories of six Southern judges, including Chief Justice Ruffin of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina). 
 16.  See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND 
CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957) (describing Shaw’s belief in the law as a system of scientific 
principles of logic and reason); R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH 
STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1985) (reviewing Story’s jurisprudence). 
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for his more famous colleague, Thomas Ruffin.17 Previous studies 
have often focused on Gaston’s personal and family life without an 
intensive study of his jurisprudence; others only paid attention to 
parts of his character, such as his political ideology or his 
representation of Quakers in their anti-slavery mission.18 By contrast, 
Gaston’s religion is my primary variable for analysis. I place Gaston’s 
religious beliefs at the center of analysis and work outward from 
those beliefs to see how they ripple through his personal papers, then 
to his extra-judicial writings, and finally to how they appear in a select 
set of his most important judicial decisions. This Article is an attempt 
to understand how those religious ideas interacted with other parts of 
Gaston’s thought and his legal philosophy. 
To that end, I begin with Gaston’s personal papers and an 
extraordinary—and until now unused—set of documents held by the 
Gaston family.19 Building on these documents, I further elucidate 
Gaston’s deeply held religious sentiments using his papers at the 
University of North Carolina’s Southern Historical Collection, his 
extra-judicial writings and oratory, and several of his more important 
judicial opinions. 
Coming from the vantage of religious thought, through the 
approach of judicial biography, I am able to highlight the ways that 
Gaston’s writings and judicial opinions drew upon his religious beliefs 
to emphasize the humanity of all people, including the enslaved, and 
how he sought to subordinate everyone—including slaveowners—to 
the rule of law. This relocates religious thought, and especially 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Thomas Ruffin: Of Moral Philosophy and 
Monuments, 87 N.C. L. REV. 799, 838 (2009) (pointing to Gaston as an example of how 
“[e]ven in Ruffin’s own place and time, there were alternative visions of slavery”). 
 18.  See Alfred L. Brophy, The Republics of Liberty and Letters: Progress, Union, and 
Constitutionalism in Graduation Addresses at the Antebellum University of North Carolina, 
89 N.C. L. REV. 1879, 1883–84 (2011) (using Gaston’s oratory as one of several examples 
to provide an understanding of “southern thought”); Timothy C. Meyer, Slavery 
Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1828–1858: William Gaston and 
Thomas Ruffin, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 313, 334 (2011) (noting the “fundamental 
difference[s]” between Gaston’s and Ruffin’s jurisprudence on slavery); Laura F. 
Edwards, The Forgotten Legal World of Thomas Ruffin: The Power of Presentism in the 
History of Slave Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 855, 872–73 (2009) (discussing Gaston’s critical role 
in the history of the Supreme Court of North Carolina); Gary R. Govert, Something There 
Is That Doesn’t Love a Wall: Reflections on the History of North Carolina’s Religious Test 
for Public Office, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (1986) (examining, inter alia, the role the 
Protestant oath played in Gaston’s career). 
 19.  These documents are part of the Gaston-Hawks Collection gifted to Tryon 
Palace, located in New Bern, North Carolina, in 2013. The collection has been in the 
continuous possession of descendants of the Gaston family and consists of Justice Gaston’s 
personal correspondence with his daughter, Catherine Jane, as well as the correspondence 
of other Gaston family members, and various other biographical information. 
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Catholic thought, to the center of analysis of Justice Gaston’s 
jurisprudence. 
Part I follows this introduction with an examination of Gaston’s 
background, education, and the early public life that first brought him 
to prominence. The Article continues in Part II with a discussion of 
some of the initial criticism Gaston received due to his Catholic faith. 
From there, the Article moves into Part III, a discussion of Gaston’s 
service on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, beginning with a 
critique of State v. Mann,20 a controversial opinion authored by his 
contemporary, Thomas Ruffin. The Article then discusses three of 
Gaston’s own significant cases affecting the legal status of slaves and 
free blacks: State v. Negro Will,21 State v. Manuel,22 and State v. 
Jarrott.23 
I.  GASTON’S BACKGROUND 
As one of the few Gaston family members remaining after the 
Revolutionary War, Justice Gaston achieved success through means 
other than family notoriety. United States District Court Judge H.G. 
Connor recounted the story of Gaston’s father, a leading patriot of 
New Bern, who was publicly murdered during the Revolution.24 
Although Gaston was identified often as a minority party member, his 
identity was more tightly bound to his Catholic faith: 
On a notable occasion he said: “Having been trained from 
infancy to worship God according to the usages, and carefully 
instructed in the creed, of the most ancient and numerous 
society of Christians in the world, after arriving at mature age, I 
deliberately embraced, from conviction, the faith which had 
been instilled into my mind by maternal piety. Without, I trust, 
offensive ostentation, I have felt myself bound, outwardly, to 
profess what I inwardly believe, and am, therefore, an avowed, 
though unworthy, member of the Roman Catholic Church.”25 
 
 20.  13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829). 
 21.  18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 121 (1834). 
 22.  20 N.C. 144, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20 (1838). 
 23.  23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 76 (1840), overruled by State v. Watson, 287 N.C. 147, 214 S.E.2d 
85 (1975). 
 24.  Henry G. Connor, William Gaston (Nov. 24, 1914), in NORTH CAROLINA BAR 
ASS’N, ADDRESSES AT THE UNVEILING AND PRESENTATION OF THE BUST OF WILLIAM 
GASTON 5, 6 (1915). 
 25.  Id. at 6; see also William Gaston, Debates of the Convention of North Carolina to 
Amend the Constitution (June 30, 1835), in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA, CALLED TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE, WHICH ASSEMBLED AT RALEIGH, JUNE 4, 1835, at 264, 265 (1836). 
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Judge Connor quoted a portion of Gaston’s speech given during the 
1835 convention to amend the Constitution of North Carolina, during 
which Gaston spoke eloquently in opposition to the Protestant oath 
of office.26 
Justice Gaston’s mother, who was intensely devoted to him, 
ensured that “above all cares,” she “deeply instilled into his young 
heart, the dogmas of her faith.”27 She first sent William Gaston “to 
Philadelphia to study under a priest,” and subsequently enrolled him 
as the first student at Georgetown.28 Although poor health forced him 
to return to New Bern to complete his studies, he was able to 
matriculate at Princeton, “graduating with highest honors in 1796.”29 
In New Bern, Gaston studied law with “the erudite French Catholic 
legal scholar F. X. Martin,” who subsequently became Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana.30 Gaston then took over his 
brother-in-law’s legal practice.31 
Gaston’s Catholic upbringing and connection to New Bern likely 
framed his attitudes towards the State’s black community. While 
Gaston lived and practiced law in New Bern, the town  
“was a majority-black community in which people of every color and 
condition interacted daily.”32 New Bern’s population grew from about 
2,500 in 1800 to over 3,700 in 1830, making it the state’s largest city.33 
Craven County, in which the town is located, “had a substantial black 
population that included both slaves and an unusually large number 
of free people of color,”34 with “337 free people of color, 3,440 whites, 
and 3,858 slaves” in 1790.35 Later records separate the town of New 
 
 26.  See Gaston, supra note 25, at 264–65 (transcribing Gaston’s speech); Robert J. 
Breckinridge, Judge Gaston of N.C.—Religious Liberty—Mental Reservation, in PAPISM IN 
THE XIX. CENTURY, IN THE UNITED STATES 80, 83 (1841) (describing how the judges’ 
oath required judges to maintain the Protestant religion). See generally Govert, supra note 
18, at 1074 (noting that the 1776 Constitution of North Carolina “permitted only 
Protestants to hold office”). 
 27.  Breckinridge, supra note 26, at 81. 
 28.  David M. Rooney, William Gaston: Ante-Bellum Southern Catholic Conservative 
(1778–1844), in CATHOLIC MAKERS OF AMERICA, at 95, 97 (Stephen M. Krason ed., 
2006). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 98. This tradition of studying law in a law office followed the study of law in 
a private home but predated the private law schools in North Carolina. Albert Coates, The 
Task of Legal Education in the South, 16 A.B.A. J. 464, 464 (1930). 
 31.  Rooney, supra note 28, at 98. 
 32.  CATHERINE W. BISHIR, CRAFTING LIVES: AFRICAN AMERICAN ARTISANS IN 
NEW BERN, NORTH CAROLINA, 1770–1900, at 20 (2013). 
 33.  Id. at 23. 
 34.  Id. at 24. 
 35.  Id. 
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Bern’s population from the county’s, showing growth from 2,467 total 
residents in 1800 with 144 free people of color and “a slight majority 
of slaves over white residents,” to “268 free blacks	.	.	.	[,] 1,475 whites 
and 1,920 slaves” by 1820.36 
Among his activities as a lawyer, Gaston “advised at least one 
client how to use a trust to free slaves by will.”37 Gaston created a 
template that the Quakers used in the early nineteenth century “for 
transferring slaves to the trustees of the Society of Friends.”38 
Additionally, Gaston actively participated in public life. He was first 
elected to the state Senate in 1800, followed by election to the House 
of Commons in 1807, where he served briefly as Speaker.39 During the 
next legislative session, he famously defended the right of Jacob 
Henry, who was Jewish, to be sworn into the legislature.40 Although 
his effort was unsuccessful, Gaston’s argument for religious liberty 
and tolerance was considered “one of the best ever heard in a state 
legislature to this time,”41 and foreshadowed his later eloquent 
indictment of the Protestant oath during the 1835 North Carolina 
Constitutional Convention.42 After serving four terms in the North 
Carolina General Assembly, Gaston ran for United States Congress 
in 1810 as a Federalist.43 Although he lost this election, he returned to 
the state senate in 1812, before his eventual election to Congress in 
1813.44 He served in Congress until 1817, before returning to North 
 
 36.  Id. at 24–25. 
 37.  Brophy, supra note 17, at 839. In 1809, Gaston advised the Quakers that 
“donations of personal property, such as	.	.	.	slaves	.	.	.	may be received to any amount.” 
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1790–1860, at 23 
(1943). 
 38.  COVER, supra note 9, at 76. 
 39.  Joseph Herman Schauinger, William Gaston: Southern Statesman, 18 N.C. HIST. 
REV. 99, 104–06 (1941). At the time, officeholders were precluded from holding office if 
they “den[ied] the Being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion	.	.	.	.” N.C. CONST. 
of 1776, §	32. Although “Catholics were the principal targets of the religious 
test[,]	.	.	.	Jews, atheists, and others were consigned to the political wilderness” because of 
similar fears that, like Catholics, they lacked the “internal sanction of conscience and thus 
[were] capable of anything.” Govert, supra note 18, at 1078; see infra Part III. 
 40.  Schauinger, supra note 39, at 106. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Gaston, supra note 25, at 285 (“Religion is exclusively an affair between man and 
his God	.	.	.	. Let not religion be abused for	.	.	.	impious tyranny—religion has nothing to do 
with it.”). 
 43.  Gaston’s loyalty to the Federalist Party was so strong that he has been referred to 
as “[a] Federalist who stubbornly remained a Federalist long after his party had died.” 
Oliver H. Orr Jr., A Principle in Faith for North Carolinians, RALEIGH NEWS & 
OBSERVER, Nov. 6, 1960 (on file with Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, in the North Carolina Collection). 
 44.  Schauinger, supra note 39, at 107. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 2051 (2016) 
2016] JUSTICE WILLIAM J. GASTON 2059 
Carolina to serve two additional terms in the state senate.45 During 
his last term in the senate, “[h]e framed the law establishing the 
present supreme court of the state; and the liberal basis upon which it 
is established, [was] to be ascribed to his zealous and efficient 
support.”46 Gaston was also a revered and sought-after speaker.47 He 
delivered an important address at the University of North Carolina in 
1832;48 he was invited to give an address to Whigs in Montgomery 
around the same time;49 he and delivered an address at Princeton in 
1835.50 
Gaston’s steadfast commitment to his Catholic faith throughout 
his career remains particularly remarkable given the religious 
backgrounds of North Carolinians at the time.51 Writing in response 
to an invitation from the Reverend Monsignor Ryder, President of 
the College of Georgetown, to give an address at Gaston’s alma 
mater, Justice Gaston stated: 
 
 45.  See id. at 113, 115. In total, he served four terms in the state senate and seven in 
the house of commons. Orr, supra note 43. 
 46.  Address from the National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans (1835) 
(on file in the Gaston-Hawks Collection, Box 4, Folder 15, Tryon Palace, New Bern, 
N.C.); see also Schauinger, supra note 39, at 115 (discussing how Gaston wrote a report 
about the “evils of the judiciary” in North Carolina and proposed the supreme court as a 
way to control inferior courts). 
 47.  One commentator cites to Gaston’s addresses, as well as his “large network of 
well-placed friends, acquired in college, in Congress, and in law practice and carefully 
nourished over the years,” as underlying reasons why he was “widely urged for 
appointment as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court on John Marshall’s 
death.” JOHN L. SANDERS, JUDGE WILLIAM GASTON 1778–1884, at 15 (Sept. 22, 1978) 
(on file with Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in the North 
Carolina Collection). 
 48.  William Gaston, Address Delivered Before the Philanthropic and Dialectic 
Societies at Chapel Hill, N.C. (June 20, 1832), in ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE 
PHILANTHROPIC AND DIALECTIC SOCIETIES AT CHAPEL HILL (Thomas W. White ed., 
2d ed. 1832). 
 49.  William Gaston, Address to Montgomery, Ala. Whigs (October 3, 1832), 
(transcript on file with Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in the 
William Gaston Papers of the Southern Historical Collection). 
 50.  William Gaston, An Address Delivered Before the American Whig and 
Cliosophic Societies of the College of New Jersey (Sept. 29, 1835), in AN ADDRESS 
DELIVERED BEFORE THE AMERICAN WHIG AND CLIOSOPHIC SOCIETIES OF THE 
COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY (2d ed. 1835). 
 51.  Members of the Catholic faith remained a small minority in North Carolina 
during Gaston’s lifetime. “[A]s late as 1833, Bishop England counted only 500 Catholics in 
North Carolina	.	.	.	.” Orr, supra note 43. This may have been the reason Gaston 
contemplated moving north, “probably to Baltimore,” where his children could receive 
“proper religious training.” SANDERS, supra note 47, at 16. This plan appears to have been 
thwarted by the rapid ascendancy of his political career, as well as the untimely death of 
his wife. Id. 
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As a Catholic, I am proud of the heroism of that noble band 
who, adhering with inflexible fidelity to the sacred Faith once 
delivered to the Saints, and carefully transmitted unchanged 
through ages by the commissioned witnesses of truth, did not 
hesitate to prefer exile, privation, danger and death, to a 
hypocritical profession of conformity to the Church by law 
established; and as an American citizen I can never cease to be 
grateful for the glorious precedent which they were the first to 
establish and by which it was shown that all undoubting 
conviction of the truth of ones [sic] own Religion is perfectly 
compatible with tenderness for the rights of conscience in 
others.52 
Gaston’s assessment of his faith squares well with Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s observations of American Catholics. During a trip to 
the United States in the 1830s, Tocqueville noted without surprise 
how faithful Catholics were to their religion as he observed that 
“Protestantism promoted independence, while Catholicism 
emphasized human equality	.	.	.	.”53 Gaston himself spoke to this 
theme in his address at Princeton,54 concluding that “[p]ublic virtue is 
the only solid basis which can uphold the glorious structure of public 
freedom; and public virtue is not to be found when the quarry of 
personal integrity has been worked off and exhausted.”55 
Gaston’s role as a rare champion of slaves’ rights during the pre-
Civil War era may be better understood in the greater context of the 
Catholic Church, specifically with respect to its view on the institution 
of slavery and how it may have informed Justice Gaston’s views on 
the matter. In his apostolic letter condemning the slave trade, Pope 
Gregory XVI acknowledged the danger slavery poses to religion, but 
 
 52.  Letter from William J. Gaston, Justice of the Supreme Court of N.C., to 
Reverend Monsignor James A. Ryder, President of College of Georgetown (November 
21, 1841), in J. Fairfax M’Laughlin, William Gaston: The First Student at Georgetown 
College, 6 RECORDS AM. CATH. HIST. SOC’Y PHILA. 225, 246–47 (1895). Gaston’s 
professed faith was not mere lip service. In 1824, Gaston was instrumental in purchasing 
the property for St. Paul’s Roman Catholic Church—the first in the state—contributing 
$700 of $2,000 raised for that purpose. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Nat’l Park Serv., 
NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES INVENTORY-NOMINATION FORM: ST. 
PAUL’S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH (1971), http://www.hpo.ncdcr.gov/nr/CV0031.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UE8G-Q542] (documenting Gaston’s role in the purchase of the 
property for the church). 
 53.  JAMES HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN 
CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (1981). 
 54.  Gaston, supra note 50, at 16–17. 
 55.  Id. at 17. 
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stopped short of calling for its abolition.56 Instead, he urged the 
faithful to look at their slaves as family and to consider freeing those 
slaves who were deserving.57 According to one commentator, 
although Pope Gregory XVI condemned the slave trade, he failed to 
condemn slavery itself.58 The Pope’s reservations filtered down to his 
bishops, who were largely silent in the face of mounting opposition to 
slavery.59 
Although the Pope refrained from a full condemnation of 
slavery, he recognized the grave problems stemming from the 
institution, not least of all for his Church. The Pope was not alone in 
his approach. Bishop John England, who had North Carolina within 
his jurisdiction as Bishop of Charleston, privately “	‘abhorred the 
condition of the slaves’	.	.	.	and called slavery ‘the greatest moral evil 
that can desolate any part of the civilized world.’	”60 Although Bishop 
England’s approach to confronting slavery did not bear “Gaston’s 
directness and boldness,” his private views were likely known to 
Gaston, especially considering the close relationship that England and 
Gaston shared.61 Another commentator summarizes the general 
Catholic position on slavery in the United States as follows: “the 
system was not looked upon as intrinsically immoral, but as a social 
blight which should be done away with gradually, so that both the 
Southern whites and blacks would not suffer the dislocating effects of 
sudden total emancipation.”62 
Here, Justice Gaston was ahead of his Catholic contemporaries. 
Gaston, in the year prior to his election to the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina, cautioned the Dialectic and Philanthropic Societies at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill that they would soon 
confront the mitigation and eventual end of slavery in North 
Carolina. Calling slavery “the worst evil that afflicts the Southern part 
of our confederacy[,]” Gaston viewed the institution as a stumbling 
 
 56.  Pope Gregory XVI, Apostolic Letter In Supremo Apostolatus (Dec. 3, 1839), in 
PAPAL ENCYCLICALS ONLINE, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Greg16/g16sup.htm [https:
//perma.cc/38V3-C9F5]. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  HENNESEY, supra note 53, at 145. 
 59.  Id. (“No Catholic bishop spoke for abolition in the prewar years.”). 
 60.  MAX LONGLEY, FOR THE UNION AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: FOUR 
CONVERTS IN THE CIVIL WAR 51–52 (2015). 
 61.  Id. at 52. 
 62.  Rooney, supra note 28, at 110. 
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block for progress, accusing it of poisoning the “morals at the 
fountain head.”63 
Gaston’s condemnation of slavery is even more compelling 
considering its timing, as it came in the year following Nat Turner’s 
dramatic rebellion in southeastern Virginia.64 In the immediate wake 
of the Turner rebellion, fear of slave rebellion reached Gaston’s New 
Bern community and spread throughout much of North Carolina, 
even to Chapel Hill.65 Thus, Gaston’s audience included many of the 
same people who previously implored the governor to take further 
steps to protect against slave rebellion.66 
In 1928, Josephus Daniels noted that when Justice Gaston spoke 
of slavery, he “astounded a large portion of his audience	.	.	.	. He fully 
understood he was speaking to young men from families whose chief 
accumulations were in slave property. But that did not deter him.”67 
Daniels emphasized Gaston’s indictment of slavery as an impairment 
of progress, noting that Gaston “went on to say what many, years 
afterward, learned to be the truth” in his pointed criticism of the 
institution.68 In Daniels’s view, Gaston’s address was the most severe 
indictment ever made of the slave system. Daniels found this 
indictment particularly compelling in light of its source: a justice 
native to North Carolina, a slaveholder himself, who existed within a 
system entirely based on the slave economy.69 
Daniels’s analysis here is perhaps one of the more helpful 
examinations of this address. He noted Gaston’s stature, his audience, 
and their mutual reliance upon the institution, and then correctly 
observed that Gaston’s words still set forth an extraordinary 
indictment of slavery, notwithstanding the potential repercussions. It 
is perhaps more remarkable that the audience cheered him and that 
the address, in fact, did not result in any readily apparent diminution 
 
 63.  HENNESEY, supra note 53, at 146–47 (quoting Judge Gaston on Slavery, 8 AM. 
CATH. HIST. RESEARCHES 71, 71 (1891)). 
 64.  Alfred L. Brophy, The Nat Turner Trials, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1825–31 (2013) 
(describing the violence of Nat Turner’s Rebellion). 
 65.  Id. at 1868–69. 
 66.  Cf. id. (describing the reactions of Chapel Hill residents to Nat Turner’s 
Rebellion). 
 67.  What Caused Judge Gaston to Write “Old North State”, RALEIGH NEWS & 
OBSERVER, Mar. 28, 1928, at 18 (on file in the Gaston-Hawks Collection, Box 1, Folder 
20, Tryon Palace, New Bern, N.C.) (stating that “outside the Quakers and other religious 
men, slavery was an acceptable institution” with few calling for its abolition). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
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in his public standing.70 In fact, Chief Justice John Marshall praised 
Gaston’s speech, stating that the principles Gaston espoused were 
“the ‘true basis of the character to which statesmen in a republic 
ought to aspire.’	”71 
II.  EARLY CRITICISM OF GASTON’S CATHOLICISM 
A letter that Justice Gaston wrote to his daughter Susan near the 
end of his life may provide some insight as to the role his faith had in 
his view of the law. The letter links Gaston’s religious beliefs to his 
jurisprudence, which would bring everyone into the protection of the 
law as it subjected everyone to the control of law. In this letter, 
Gaston emphasized the particular role of a jurist in administering 
justice, connecting that role to a “holy office”: 
To administer justice in the last resort, to expound and apply 
the laws for the advancement of right and the suppression of 
wrong, is an ennobling and indeed a holy office, and the 
exercise of its functions, while it raises my mind above the mists 
of the earth, above cares and passions, into a pure and serene 
atmosphere, always seems to impart fresh vigor to my 
understanding and a better temper to my whole soul.72 
Justice Gaston’s adherence to his faith and sense of duty likely 
figured prominently in his path to serving as a justice of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina. Though he was twice approached to take 
the place of original justices of the court that he had been a central 
force in fashioning, Gaston twice declined these opportunities.73 His 
reasons for declining are somewhat unclear, though they may have 
been related to Gaston’s financial responsibilities to his family. North 
Carolina justices were notoriously poorly compensated, and Gaston 
had both a large debt to retire and a large income as a lawyer.74 In 
Gaston’s stead, Justice Thomas Ruffin and Justice Joseph J. Daniel 
 
 70.  Connor, supra note 24, at 25 (“Dr. Battle says: ‘It is remarkable that when the 
public mind was inflamed peculiarly on account of the bloody insurrection of Nat Turner 
in the preceding year, the orator should have frankly acknowledged himself an advocate of 
the ultimate abolition of slavery and that the audience cheered the utterance	.	.	.	. This 
bold language did not weaken his standing in the State.’	”). 
 71.  Brophy, supra note 18, at 1881 (quoting Letter from John Marshall, Chief Justice, 
Supreme Court of the United States, to Thomas W. White (Aug. 9, 1832), in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 232 (Charles F. Hobson, ed., 2012). 
 72.  Rooney, supra note 28, at 118 (referencing a letter Gaston wrote to his daughter 
Susan towards the end of Gaston’s life). 
 73.  Schauinger, supra note 39, at 123. 
 74.  See infra text accompanying notes 87–90. 
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joined the court.75 However, in 1833, Gaston was persuaded to join 
the court upon the death of the third original justice, Leonard 
Henderson.76 Both Governor Swain and Justice Ruffin implored him 
to do so, making the argument that absent William Gaston, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina would cease to exist.77 Perhaps this 
is why Gaston stated to the Convention for Revisiting the 
Constitution of North Carolina78 that acceptance of this position was 
based upon the fact that, “in [his] judgment, they made out a plain 
case of duty not to decline the appointment, unless the Constitution 
excluded [him] from it because of [his] religious opinions.”79 
Despite strong backing for Gaston’s taking a seat on the court, 
he faced very real opposition for his Catholic views. Henry Seawell, a 
prominent lawyer of the time, stated “his concern that ‘the integrity 
of the Protestant religion would be seriously affected by Gaston’s 
election to the bench.’	”80 He also received particular criticism for 
taking what was commonly referred to as the Protestant oath when he 
joined the court.81 The Presbyterian minister Robert Breckinridge, 
author of the essay, “Judge Gaston of N.C.—Religious Liberty—
Mental Reservation,”82 used the oath’s supposed support of 
 
 75.  Schauinger, supra note 39, at 123. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Gaston’s speech to the Convention lasted for a full day and fills forty pages of 
transcript in the Convention’s proceedings. SANDERS, supra note 47, at 10. Sanders notes 
that Gaston used “learned historical references and close legal reasoning,” as well as 
“solemnity and sarcasm” to entreat the assembly to eliminate “all religious tests for public 
office.” Id. Gaston concluded as follows: 
The question before us is one, not of practical convenience, but of fundamental 
principles. He who would sacrifice such principles to the passion or caprice or 
excitement of the moment, may be called a politician, but he is no Statesman. We 
are now examining into the soundness of the foundation of our institutions. If we 
rest the fabric of the Constitution upon prejudices, unreasoning and mutable 
prejudices, we build upon sand; but let us lay it on the broad and firm basis of 
natural right, equal justice and universal freedom—freedom of opinion—freedom, 
civil and religious—freedom as approved by the wise, and sanctioned by the 
good—and then may we hope that it shall stand against the storms of faction, 
violence and injustice, for then we shall have founded it upon a ROCK. 
Gaston, supra note 25, at 304–05; see SANDERS, supra note 47, at 10. 
 79.  Gaston, supra note 25, at 265. 
 80.  Meyer, supra note 18, at 337 (quoting Joseph Herman Schauinger, William 
Gaston and the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 21 N.C. HIST. REV. 97, 105 (1944)). 
 81.  See Breckinridge, supra note 26, at 80, 83. 
 82.  Id. at 80. Specifically, the author states, inter alia, that “Mr. Gaston has been for 
many years one of the most distinguished citizens of North Carolina.” Id. at 81; see also 
Rooney, supra note 28, at 112 (identifying Breckinridge as the author of the piece). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 2051 (2016) 
2016] JUSTICE WILLIAM J. GASTON 2065 
Protestant religion to call into question Gaston’s integrity for 
swearing the oath as a Catholic.83 
The controversy involving Justice Gaston and the oath also 
implicated concerns about whether he had obtained some 
“ecclesiastical dispensations or permission to hold an office under the 
State of North Carolina.”84 Justice Gaston responded to the charge in 
a letter to the editor of the Lexington Gazette, in which he declared 
that the accusation was “wholly false.”85 Justice Gaston explained that 
many respected state officials encouraged his acceptance of the 
appointment.86 He further explained there were “difficulties in the 
way of an immediate determination” of his acceptance of the position, 
but dispelled any rumors that this delay was in any way connected to 
“constitutional scruples.”87 He reassured the public that, after seeking 
counsel, he was “satisfied that [his] religious principles did not 
incapacitate [him] from taking the office.”88 It is likely that the 
“difficulties” that postponed Gaston’s acceptance of the position were 
due to his financial situation, which was likely a far greater barrier to 
his service on the court.89 In what would be a very unusual—if not 
unethical—arrangement today, Gaston was provided with the means 
to pay off his debts and was elected to the vacancy.90 
 
  Prior to the adoption of the 1866 and 1868 constitutions, members of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina were called “judge,” rather than “justice.” See James Logan 
Hunt, Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law and Political Change in Nineteenth-
Century North Carolina, 66 N.C. L. REV. 421, 426 n.69 (1988) (citing N.C. CONST. of 1865, 
art. IV, §	2 (1866); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §	8; Kemp P. Battle, An Address on the 
History of the Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 1889), in 103 N.C. 339, 362 (1889)). This Article 
uses the modern term “justice” for purposes of clarity. 
 83.  Breckinridge, supra note 26, at 82 (“Before he took his seat on the bench, he took 
an oath in some usual form, to support the constitution of that state. Part of that 
constitution asserts and assumes the truth of the Protestant religion. But Mr. Gaston is an 
avowed and most decided papist!”). Gaston also held forth on this subject at some length 
during the Constitutional Convention of 1835, explaining that Catholics owed no 
“allegiance” to the Pope, but instead were connected to him by a “spiritual tie.” Gaston, 
supra note 25, at 293. 
 84.  Breckinridge, supra note 26, at 91. 
 85.  Id. at 92. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Schauinger, supra note 35, at 124. 
 90.  Id. Unfortunately, this was not the end of Gaston’s financial difficulties. At 
various times, he wrote to his daughters Eliza and Catherine Jane about the issue. First, in 
1835, he wrote to Eliza that he was “greatly pleased” with her “remarks about 
economy,	.	.	.	hav[ing] a large debt contracted from a disregard to that virtue which it is my 
purpose to pay off in three annual installments.” Letter from William J. Gaston to Eliza G. 
(Jan. 11, 1835) (on file with Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
in the Gaston Papers of the Southern Historical Collection, Folder 68). He also was very 
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III.  GASTON AND THE SUPREME COURT 
On the Supreme Court of North Carolina, many of Gaston’s 
views appear in relief against those of Democratic jurist Thomas 
Ruffin. In a series of cases involving such issues as the criminal 
prosecution of slaves91 and the rights of owners,92 Gaston’s ideology 
departed in significant ways from the Democrats’.93 Gaston sought to 
place definite limits on the power of slaveowners to punish enslaved 
humans and thus sought to bring everyone within the rule of law. He 
also sought to protect private property from intrusion by the state 
government. Due to these views, historians have viewed his life and 
jurisprudence primarily through his political identity and ideology as 
a Whig.94 While Gaston was indeed a Federalist95 and later a Whig,96 
the focus of this Article instead shifts the emphasis from his political 
ideology to his Catholic faith, a faith which sought to raise the 
humanity of enslaved people and to bring everyone within the control 
of religious tenets. 
A. Ruffin’s Slavery Jurisprudence: Entrenching Oppression in North 
Carolina’s Case Law 
Although Justice Gaston is recognized for his own cases 
involving the lives of slaves, those cases still must be viewed in 
context. In 1830, just three years before Gaston would join the court, 
 
candid in addressing his continuing financial struggles in a letter to his daughter, Catherine 
Jane, written in 1842. Letter from William J. Gaston to Catherine Jane Washington (Dec. 
21, 1842) (on file with the Gaston-Hawks Collection, Box 1, Folder 40, Tryon Palace, New 
Bern, N.C.). He explained his history of indebtedness, and noted that it had caused him 
“mortification and humiliation,” but that he was back in debt $5000—in part to finish “our 
church.” He had a plan for paying it off, but his crop was not as successful as he had 
hoped, and his debt increased to $6000. He proposed a scheme of economies and proposed 
that Catherine Jane keep a memorandum of her expenses. He also laid out his plan to pay 
off $3000 of his debt in the next year. Id. 
 91.  See, e.g., State v. Negro Will, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 121 (1834). 
 92.  See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20 (1838). 
 93.  Cf. Brophy, supra note 64, at 1822–23 (noting how Ruffin, a Democrat, and 
Gaston, a Whig, had different visions about the role of the law with regards to slavery). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Memorializing Gaston, R.D.W. Connor noted that Gaston likely “would have 
much preferred to be called ‘Last of the Federalists.’	” R.D.W. Connor, William Gaston: A 
Southern Federalist of the Old School and His Yankee Friends—1778–1844, 43 PROC. AM. 
ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 381, 381 (1933). 
 96.  Because of his “strong convictions and party loyalty” to the Federalists, Gaston’s 
religious ideology is likely a better measure than his later political affiliation as a Whig. 
See James Hugh Slaughter, The Lonely Federalist: William Gaston in Congress, 1813–1817 
at 74 (1986) (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on 
file with Knapp Library, University of North Carolina School of Government). 
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Justice Ruffin authored State v. Mann97—a case generally regarded as 
a low point in North Carolina jurisprudence.98 In Mann, the issue 
before the court was whether a master who had hired a slave was 
liable for a battery committed upon her—specifically, whether the 
hiring master could shoot the slave when she was fleeing him while 
being punished for an offense.99 Although Ruffin acknowledged his 
concerns about addressing the institution of slavery in this context, he 
recognized that the court could not avoid the matter.100 
Ruffin reiterated the same message at the end of the opinion. His 
words were harsh, noting “the imperative duty of the Judges to 
recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where 
the exercise of it is forbidden by statute.”101 Ruffin deemed this 
exercise “essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of 
the master, and the public tranquility, greatly dependent upon their 
subordination; and in fine, as most effectually securing the general 
protection and comfort of the slaves themselves.”102 
Notwithstanding his stated concerns, Justice Ruffin meted out 
harsh justice for the slave, Lydia, the victim of defendant Mann’s 
wrath, entering judgment in Mann’s favor.103 Harriet Beecher Stowe 
utilized this conflicted language, as well as the remainder of the 
opinion, in support of her second novel, The Key to Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin.104 She used Ruffin to her advantage therein, characterizing him 
 
 97.  13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1830). 
 98.  See Edwards, supra note 18, at 895 (referring to Mann as Ruffin’s “most infamous 
ruling”); Sally Greene & Eric L. Muller, Introduction: State v. Mann and Thomas Ruffin in 
History and Memory, 87 N.C. L. REV. 669, 669 (2009) (referring to Mann as “notorious”); 
John V. Orth, When Analogy Fails: The Common Law and State v. Mann, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
979, 979 (2009) (referring to Mann as “notorious”); Judge James A. Wynn Jr., State v. 
Mann: Judicial Choice or Judicial Duty?, 87 N.C. L. REV. 991, 991 (2009) (“Ruffin made 
the judicial choice to preserve the relational status quo between master and slave rather 
than recognize slaves as sentient beings entitled to rights afforded by the rule of law.”). 
 99.  Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263. 
 100.  Id. at 264 (“A Judge cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are 
brought into judgment. It is impossible that the reasons on which they go can be 
appreciated, but where institutions similar to our own exist and are thoroughly 
understood. The struggle, too, in the Judge’s own breast between the feelings of the man, 
and the duty of the magistrate is a severe one, presenting strong temptation to put aside 
such questions, if it be possible.”). 
 101.  Id. at 268. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (1853); see also 
THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 190 (1996); 
TUSHNET, supra note 11, at 2; Alfred L. Brophy, Humanity, Utility, and Logic in Southern 
Legal Thought: Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Vision in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal 
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as “among the ‘men of honor, men of humanity, men of kindest and 
gentlest feelings’ who were ‘obliged to interpret these severe laws 
with inflexible severity.’ “105 Ruffin’s opinion was “so characteristic, 
and so strongly express[ed] the conflict between the feelings of the 
humane judge and the logical necessity of a strict interpreter of slave-
law.”106 In Ruffin, Stowe found “the unflinching calmness with which 
a man, evidently possessed of honorable and human intentions, walks 
through the most extreme and terrible results and conclusions, in 
obedience to the laws of legal truth.”107 This is but one view of 
Mann—that its stark presentation of slavery juxtaposed against the 
legal imperatives by which the justice was bound would likely lead to 
the institution’s demise.108 
Ruffin acknowledged that the decision, which asks whether 
slaves could have any legal recourse against their master, was one of 
first impression.109 His view of the relationship between master and 
slave, while likely that of many of his contemporaries, was stark and 
rested upon his analysis of the nature of slavery. 
Ruffin viewed slavery as serving several purposes—the profit of 
the master, the master’s security, and public safety. In asking what 
moral considerations were due to a slave, Ruffin emphasized that the 
system depended upon slaves having “no will of [their] own[,]” a lack 
of will predicated on “uncontrolled authority over the body” of the 
slave by the slaveholder. Famously stating that “[t]he power of the 
master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave 
perfect[,]” Ruffin eliminated any hope that the judiciary might rein in 
abusive slaveholders through criminal punishment. Conceding that 
what he wrote was harsh, Ruffin justified his position by claiming that 
it was necessary for the survival of a slave-based society.110 
Despite being confronted with a case of first impression 
regarding an admittedly harsh regime, Ruffin still elected to allow a 
battery to go unpunished, even after a jury found the defendant 
 
Swamp, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1132 (1998) (discussing Stowe’s interpretation of State v. 
Mann in both The Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Dred). 
 105.  TUSHNET, supra note 11, at 2 (quoting STOWE, supra note 104, at 133). 
 106.  Id. (quoting STOWE, supra note 104, at 145). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Brophy, supra note 17, at 800 (“Perhaps Ruffin aided the cause of antislavery 
through his honesty in State v. Mann.”). 
 109.  State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 265 (1830) (“[W]hether the owner is 
answerable criminaliter, for a battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority or 
force, not forbidden by statute, the Court entertains but little doubt.—That he is so liable, 
has never yet been decided	.	.	.	. There have been no prosecutions of the sort.”). 
 110.  Id. at 266–67. 
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guilty.111 Not only did the jury’s decision give Ruffin some sense of the 
ideals in the community, but the Attorney General also prosecuted 
the case on behalf of the State. Yet Ruffin and the concurring justices 
then on the court chose to overrule both. Further in support of an 
alternative holding, an English court employed “the same absence of 
analogy	.	.	.	in favor of freedom for a slave.”112 One commentator 
concisely described Mann’s harsh holding as follows: slaveholders 
could not be prosecuted for assaults on their own slaves, and “slavery 
required for its maintenance that slaves be aware that they were 
subject to their owners’ complete and total control and that they had 
no place to appeal when they believed their owners had abused 
them	.	.	.	.”113 As another judge writing about Mann has suggested, this 
was indeed a matter of “judicial choice,” rather than “judicial 
duty.”114 
This unyielding fidelity to his interpretation of the relationship 
between master and slave was a position Ruffin consistently held 
throughout his tenure on the court. In a much later case, State v. 
Caesar,115 in which a slave who was a third party to a dispute received 
a manslaughter charge, Ruffin accused Justice Pearson, and perhaps 
Gaston, indirectly, of holding naïve views about the state of southern 
society. Ruffin chastised Justice Pearson for not being as cautious as 
he should be, accusing him of failing to promote public security and 
the common welfare. Emphasizing adherence to existing law, Ruffin 
admonished a decision that many would view as compassionate.116 
One commentator suggests that underpinning Ruffin’s analysis is 
an “incessant focus on the public safety of the white community, 
rather than a consistent justification based on statutes or common 
law.”117 Ruffin’s focus “even went so far [as] to suggest that [Mann], 
which merely reversed a murder conviction on the grounds that there 
might have been sufficient provocation to mitigate the charge to 
manslaughter, would sow the seeds of a slave revolt	.	.	.	.”118 In 
 
 111.  See id. at 268 (reversing the judgment and directing the entry of judgment for the 
defendant). 
 112.  See Orth, supra note 98, at 979 (2009). In fact, “Ruffin’s conclusion that the 
common law provided no analogy for the master-slave relation found ironic support in a 
celebrated English case that Ruffin almost certainly knew but did not cite: Somerset’s Case 
from 1772.” Id. at 986 (citing Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772)). 
 113.  TUSHNET, supra note 11, at 1. 
 114.  Wynn, supra note 98, at 991 (2009). 
 115.  31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391 (1849). 
 116.  Meyer, supra note 18, at 322–23 (quoting Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) at 415). 
 117.  Id. at 323. 
 118.  Id. 
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contrast, another commentator cites to Ruffin’s opinion in State v. 
Hoover,119 which acknowledged that Mann had gone too far.120 The 
unfortunate irony of Ruffin’s decisions is that he “transformed the 
common law of North Carolina into an instrument of economic 
change,”121 yet “showed a remarkable reluctance in State v. Mann to 
utilize the common law to move society forward in its attitude toward 
the treatment of slaves.”122 
While Justice Gaston is commonly viewed as a foil to Justice 
Ruffin, his jurisprudence is better understood by comparison to his 
contemporaries. Gaston’s notable slavery and race-related opinions, 
which challenged ideas held by Ruffin and others, disclose a richer 
understanding of Gaston’s views on the inherent equality of all 
humankind, regardless of the color of one’s skin. 
B. Tempering Ruffin’s Harsh Treatment of Slaves: Gaston’s Slavery 
and Race-Related Jurisprudence 
As noted above, Gaston is well-known for his opinions dealing 
with slaves. During his tenure on the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, approximately 100 of his 474 opinions dealt with slavery.123 
Many involved contract124 or will125 disputes, but three of the most 
significant opinions he authored dealt with criminal law: State v. 
Negro Will,126 State v. Manuel,127 and State v. Jarrott.128 
1.  State v. Negro Will: Gaston Makes an Early Statement of Judicial 
Independence 
The first of these, State v. Negro Will, came before the court in 
1834, not long after Gaston took the bench.129 With State v. Mann as 
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precedent, Gaston confronted the issue of whether a slave who killed 
his overseer, while in fear for his life, was guilty of murder or 
manslaughter.130 Specifically, Will, the defendant and a slave, had a 
dispute with another slave, Allen, who was also the foreman of the 
plantation, about the use of a hoe.131 After Allen informed the 
overseer, Baxter, of the exchange, Baxter pursued Will with his gun, 
shooting Will in the back.132 Will escaped and Baxter put down his 
gun while pursuing Will. When Baxter caught up with Will, they 
scuffled and Baxter was killed as a result of a knife wound inflicted to 
the arm.133 Will was indicted for murder.134 
Notwithstanding the indictment, the jury returned a special 
verdict requesting that the court decide on their behalf whether Will 
was guilty.135 As in Mann, the sense of the community, as expressed 
through the jury, clearly evinced some sense that a slave shared some 
of the rights of general society. This history of mitigation by jury is 
rich throughout American jurisprudence,136 and it is a credit to Justice 
Gaston that he had the wisdom to follow the lead of the jury in this 
case, rather than thwart it, as Justice Ruffin had done in Mann. 
Will’s attorney, Bartholomew Figures Moore, made a strong 
argument against Mann, while simultaneously endeavoring to respect 
its author, Chief Justice Ruffin, who continued to serve on the 
court.137 Cautioning that his argument was not “intended to combat 
the correctness of the decision in State v. Mann,”138 Moore established 
that the principles in Mann “were never intended to cover the entire 
relation between master and slave.”139 More narrowly, he expressed 
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concern that the power a master wields over his slave should only be 
that to effectuate “securing the services and labors of the slave, and 
no farther.”140 Throughout his argument, Moore developed 
compelling reasoning that would become the basis of Gaston’s 
opinion, drawing both from the court’s own precedents in State v. 
Reed141 and State v. Hale,142 and generally denouncing the dangers of 
absolute power.143 
Notwithstanding his statement of deference to the Mann court, 
Moore offered a powerful indictment of its reasoning by stating that 
the case used language that “not only represses thought, and 
extinguishes all power to deliberate on any command of his master, 
however repugnant to natural justice it may be, and whether its 
execution is to affect himself or others; but it professes to control into 
perfect tameness the instinct of self-preservation.”144 Moore aptly 
observed that human nature would not be denied, even if the 
individual expression of that human nature was made by a slave. 
Moore also subtly suggested that the Mann holding may have the 
opposite result that was intended in tamping down potential slave 
rebellion.145 He argued that punishing a person for acting on the 
instinct of self-preservation “can serve no purpose but to gratify the 
revengeful feelings of one class of people and to inflame the hidden 
animosities of the other.”146 From this argument, he immediately 
moved into a criticism of Mann, noting that those who were enslaved 
were most likely to learn from their masters.147 Moreover, since most 
slaveowners chose not to exercise the absolute power sanctioned by 
Mann, even more severe consequences could result as a response to 
the unusual occasion of its exercising. By arguing that Mann could 
have precisely the opposite intended effect, Moore incorporated 
public safety as a valid concern. 
Moore also noted the basic legal precept, applicable to members 
of law enforcement, that “[t]he law has so high a regard for human 
life, that it directs the officer to permit an escape rather than kill.”148 
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Here, Moore argued, Will was engaged “in the act of disobedience, 
and not of resistance, between which there is a substantial 
difference.”149 He went on to take the position that the courts have 
advanced the condition of the slave and legislation gradually evolved 
to improve the existence of slaves, both through the influence of 
Christian precepts and the improvement of civilization.150 
Moore was joined in his thoughts by his co-counsel, George 
Washington Mordecai. Though Mordecai made a more workmanlike 
argument, he ably pointed out that the General Assembly passed 
many acts in the early nineteenth century that improved the status of 
slaves; however, he noted that before 1817 there was still no lesser 
offense than “wilful and malicious killing of slaves.”151 This unequal 
system of punishment ended in 1817, finally placing the killing of a 
slave on the “same footing” as the killing of a white person in similar 
circumstances. The court later mirrored the legislature’s direction, 
holding in Reed and Hale that the murder of a slave and the battery of 
a slave committed by a free man other than the master were 
indictable, respectively.152 Mordecai used these cases and other 
progressions in the law to demonstrate that slaves “are now viewed, 
both in the eye of the law and of society, as human beings, liable to be 
operated upon by the same passions, subject to the same infirmity, 
and under the protection of the same laws with the white man.”153 In 
this, he characterized Mann as an outlier.154 
Most importantly, the arguments of Moore and Mordecai sought 
to bring everyone within the control of the law. At a time when the 
fear of slave rebellion was great, the defense made the argument that 
there were limits on the overseer’s power over Will. These limits had 
the effect of protecting slaves through law and limiting the authority 
of owners (and their assistants, by extension) over slaves. This was a 
controversial and high order, but it was also consistent with the Whig 
 
 149.  Id. at 143. 
 150.  Id. at 141–42. 
 151.  Id. at 156. 
 152.  Id. at 147–48. 
 153.  Id. at 148. 
 154.  See id. at 152 (“If the Court intended, as it is believed they did, to say that the 
master possessed full and complete power and authority to secure the services and insure 
the obedience of the slave, this is admitted; but if this power and authority were held to 
extend so far as to take the life of the slave, or even to place it in jeopardy, except in the 
cases before mentioned, it is submitted that no such power is necessary or ought to be 
granted to the master, that no such authority is conferred by any legislative enactment or 
judicial determination; but that all our modern legislation and adjudication previously to 
the case of State v. Mann, have had a directly contrary tendency.”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 2051 (2016) 
2074 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
ideology that sought to impose the constraints of law on everyone,155 
and was consistent with Gaston’s own views.156 
Attorney General John Reeves Jones Daniel argued the case for 
the state, conceding “that the master has no right to take the life of 
the slave under such circumstances as would indicate that malice 
essential to murder or a felonious intent.”157 Like Mordecai, Daniel 
felt it important to trace the legal history of the relationship between 
master and slave.158 However, he took exception to the opinions in 
State v. Boon159 and State v. Reed, arguing that if they were “correct, 
absolute slavery has never existed in this State—indeed [it] could 
not.”160 Daniel principally criticized Reed for its reliance upon the 
Common Law of England, which was governed by a king, where 
slavery was unlawful, and where the subject of the killing was a 
“villain,” rather than a slave.161 Daniel’s argument proceeded in 
clinical fashion, asking the court whether a slave who has been subject 
to the absolute authority of a master at the time the slave trade was in 
full effect is entitled to the protection of the law.162 Even more 
callously—at least to the modern reader—Daniel continued by 
indicating that “to insist upon such an application of the principles of 
the common law would be to annihilate all right to this species of 
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property	.	.	.	.”163 In reaching this conclusion, he relied upon cases 
from the time of William and Mary that concluded “one could not 
have such property in a negro	.	.	.	.”164 
Notwithstanding his other arguments, Daniel also conceded that 
“[i]t is true that absolute slavery is inconsistent with the moral law,”165 
but qualified this statement to the point of eviscerating its meaning. 
He argued that society’s political laws “should, as far as can be, 
conform to the moral law, but some must, in the nature of things, rest 
for their justification, or excuse, in principles of policy.”166 He 
illustrated this point by noting, for example, that “[m]any municipal 
regulations are arbitrary in reference to the natural or moral law,”167 
enacted instead “with a view to the great ends for which civil 
government was instituted.”168 Bringing the argument to the instant 
case, he noted differences of opinion on whether “property” should 
be subject to natural law or political law.169 
To the extent that Daniel engaged in these strained justifications, 
he impaired his stronger argument. This stronger argument relied 
upon the legal precedents then in place to emphasize the fact that—
contrary to Moore’s argument that Mann was the outlier—Reed was 
in fact the outlier, as was some of the reasoning set forth in Boon.170 
Daniel also defied credulity when he claimed that there could be no 
legal provocation in this scenario that would justify reducing the 
murder charge to manslaughter when the law recognized an absolute 
right of the master over the slave under Mann.171 Daniel contended 
that, despite how repugnant the right may be to morals or to 
Christianity, slaves must submit to the absolute authority of their 
masters.172 To Daniel, any other holding would be contradictory. He 
believed the case would inevitably result in the conclusion that any 
provocation by a master could not constitute a “legal provocation” 
necessary to mitigate a murder charge against a slave to manslaughter 
in light of the master’s absolute authority.173 It is difficult to conceive 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. (citing Smith v. Gould (1705) 91 Eng. Rep. 567; 2 Salk. 666; Chamberlain v. 
Harvey (1697) 91 Eng. Rep. 994; 1 Ld. Raym. 146). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 155–56. 
 168.  Id. at 156. 
 169.  See id. 
 170.  Id. at 154–55. 
 171.  Id. at 160. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 2051 (2016) 
2076 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
how anyone—at any time—could make the argument that being shot 
in the back was “a lawful correction” for refusing to use a particular 
hoe. 
In Daniel’s view, there was no logical way to apply white society 
standards to determine the “capability of the slave to submit to 
correction[,]” for he believed that slavery was worse than death for a 
free man, but for a person born into slavery, the situation was met 
with contentment and often preferred to freedom. Daniels posited 
that, for a slave who accepted himself or herself as property of the 
master, there were no feelings of degradation that a white person 
might experience were they similarly punished: 
To withhold from a slave, therefore, who has slain his master, 
that extenuation due to the passions of a white man, would not 
be too much for human nature inured to slavery, to submit to; 
and while it would detract nothing from the security of the 
slave, it would add to that of the master.174 
This portion of Daniel’s argument is simply difficult to fathom in its 
heartlessness and complete absence of humanity. Daniel argued that 
a ruling in favor of the slave in this instance would “increase the 
importance of the slave” and inspire insurrection.175 Employing fear 
tactics and imagining what might happen, Daniel painted a picture of 
society’s destruction at the hands of a newly self-important slave, who 
would stop at nothing short of absolute emancipation after 
experiencing their master’s restrained authority.176 
Similar to Mann and other instances, Daniel appealed to fear in 
the community at the end of his argument, focusing on the fear of 
servile rebellion that had grounding in recent reality.177 It was a classic 
argument among Democrats that law should not constrain owners’ 
authority over slaves. This was the ultimate demonstration of the 
spirit of Democratic ideas, from President Andrew Jackson’s 
treatment of Native Americans to the spirit of mob rule in Northern 
cities where mobs attacked free African Americans and Catholics.178 
Similarly, this fear-based mentality of controlling “property” served 
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as the foundation for Justice Ruffin’s opinion in Mann and was 
generally a recurring theme in cases dealing with slavery.179 
While the callousness of his argument perplexes the modern 
reader, Daniel’s argument is perhaps even more perplexing in light of 
his audience—Justice Gaston was a member of his panel. Legal 
arguments obviously are intended to secure the votes of the persons 
to whom they are directed, whether it be a jury or a judge. Since 
Daniel’s audience was the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and 
particularly Justice Gaston, he should have considered Gaston’s 
address at the University of North Carolina in which he expressed a 
readily apparent disdain for the institution of slavery.180 Accordingly, 
it is difficult to understand why Daniel would have strayed so far from 
the strength of legal precedent, when Gaston’s opposition to 
slavery—made crystal clear in his address at the University of North 
Carolina—would preclude the effectiveness of any emotional or 
policy pleas. 
To his credit, Justice Gaston did not succumb to this argument; 
instead, he handled the case with relative dispatch, especially given 
the complexity of the arguments presented to the court. After 
establishing the legal definitions of murder and manslaughter, Gaston 
recounted the facts of the case before him—stating that the overseer 
intended to “corporal[ly] chastise[]” the prisoner. Knowing the 
punishment that would follow, the prisoner fled, and the overseer 
subsequently shot the prisoner in the back. Gaston described the 
resulting wound as one “likely to occasion death.”181 The prisoner 
nonetheless continued his retreat but was overcome by the overseer 
and other nearby slaves. In the proceeding scuffle, the overseer was 
mortally wounded.182 
Gaston conceded that the same fact pattern between two 
freemen would present a clear outcome: “the homicide could not 
have been more than manslaughter,” regardless of their relative 
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stations in life.183 As an example, he used the relationship between a 
master and an apprentice.184 However, Gaston acknowledged what 
appeared to be well-accepted doctrine: “[u]nconditional submission is 
the general duty of the slave; unlimited power is, in general, the legal 
right of the master.”185 Furthermore, he cautioned that this right did 
not include a master’s “right to slay his slave,” and the obligation of 
submission did not preclude the slave’s “right to defend himself 
against the unlawful attempt of his master to deprive him of life.”186 
Significantly, Gaston viewed both the slave’s protection from harm 
and ability to defend himself as matters of right, common to the 
human condition. 
In his opinion, Gaston suggested an indictment of slavery 
generally when he stated: 
There is no legal limitation to the master’s power of 
punishment, except that it shall not reach the life of his 
offending slave. It is for the Legislature to remove this reproach 
from amongst us if, consistently with the public safety, it can be 
removed. We must administer the law, such as it is, confided to 
our keeping.187 
His approach was cautious, though, deferring to the legislature on 
whether the institution of slavery should survive. 
Gaston summarized the court’s agreement that the overseer was 
within his right to question Will regarding his “offense” and to “inflict 
such chastisement as, according to the usages of discipline and his 
sound discretion, was proper to enforce subordination.”188 He added 
that Will’s attempt to evade the punishment “was a breach of duty,” 
but one that did not rise to the level of “resistance nor rebellion, and it 
certainly afforded no justification nor excuse for the barbarous act 
which followed. Had the prisoner died of the wound which the 
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overseer inflicted, the latter would have been guilty of manslaughter 
at least—probably of murder.”189 
Utilizing tautology, Gaston empathized outright with Will: 
[A]fter the gun was fired, all must see that a vast change was 
effected in the situation of the prisoner; and that new and 
strong impulses to action must have been impressed upon his 
mind. Suffering under the torture of a wound likely to 
terminate in death, and inflicted by a person having, indeed, 
authority over him, but wielding power with the extravagance 
and madness of fury; chased in hot pursuit; baited and hemmed 
in like a crippled beast of prey that cannot run far; it became 
instinct, almost uncontrollable instinct, to fly; it was human 
infirmity to struggle; it was terror or resentment, the strongest 
of human passions, or both combined, which gave to the 
struggle its fatal results; and this terror, this resentment, could 
not but have been excited in any one who had the ordinary 
feelings and frailties of human nature. But will the law permit 
human infirmity to extenuate a homicide from murder to 
manslaughter, in any case where the slayer is a slave, and the 
slain is the representative of his master? Will it allow in such a 
case any passions, however common to human beings, and 
however strongly provoked into action, to repel the allegation 
of malice?190 
In this argument, with the possible exception of his reference to being 
“baited and hemmed in liked a crippled beast of prey,”191 Gaston set 
forth a scenario that anyone could understand and with which anyone 
could, like him, empathize. He questioned what the law would do, but 
just as easily could have questioned what any person in Will’s place 
would have done. As we saw in his speech at Princeton, Gaston was 
concerned with the moral application of the rule of law. 
Left with a conundrum, Gaston posited: 
What, then, is the true principle which characterizes the various 
adjudications on the subject of provocation and excited 
passion? I am compelled to say that no other is to be found but 
what is contained in the primary rule itself, applied from time to 
time by wisdom and experience to cases as they occurred, until, 
in a vast majority of the cases that can occur, the existing 
tribunals of justice find a safe guide in the undisputed decisions 
of their predecessors. Where they have not this guide, they are 
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bound to act as those acted who had no precedent to direct 
them. We have no adjudged case that determines this question, 
or presents us with a precise rule by which to determine it.192 
Instead of leaning on Mann as precedent, which would have 
bolstered the case against Will, Gaston reframed Mann’s holding in 
humanistic terms, stating that Mann “decides, indeed, that the master 
or temporary owner is not indictable for a cruel and unreasonable 
battery of his slave,” but “[n]one could feel more strongly the 
harshness of the proposition than those who found themselves 
obliged to declare it a proposition of law.”193 He perceived that Mann 
was the result of “those who found themselves obliged to declare it a 
proposition of law. Not that they for one moment admitted that 
cruelty was rightful, but they found no law by which to ascertain what 
was cruelty in the master, so as to render it punishable as a public 
offense.”194 
Gaston did use Mann to underscore that the court there 
“pronounced, what was indeed beyond question, that the law protects 
the life of the slave against the violence of his master, and that the 
homicide of a slave, like that of a freeman, is murder or 
manslaughter.”195 As such, he concluded, an attempt on a slave’s life 
is an act that “may rightfully be resisted.”196 
In closing, Gaston returned to the notion of humanity, albeit 
cloaked as “inhumanity,” questioning, “if the passions of the slave be 
excited into unlawful violence by the inhumanity of his master or 
temporary owner, or one clothed with the master’s authority, is it a 
conclusion of law that such passions must spring from diabolical 
malice?”197 
Gaston then turned to a personal appeal, employing the pronoun 
“I” to make a moral argument, as opposed to a legal one. Only three 
times prior to this paragraph in the opinion had he used this personal 
pronoun, and those dealt with his general “reproach” of slavery.198 
Here, his plea was not of legal, but of Christian import: 
Unless I see my way clear as a sunbeam, I cannot believe that 
this is the law of a civilized people and of a Christian land. I will 
not presume an arbitrary and inflexible rule so sanguinary in its 
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character and so repugnant to the spirit of those holy statutes 
which “rejoice the heart, enlighten the eyes, and are true and 
righteous altogether.”199 
Gaston quoted Psalms 19 in support of his decision, clearly one of 
personal significance given his use of the personal pronoun. He 
remained deferential to the legislature in its ability to “prescribe such 
a law,” despite criticizing such a law as “repugnant.”200 Yet he was 
clear that the court’s jurisdiction over this matter was proper, given 
the common law implications of the case. Unlike Ruffin in Mann, 
Gaston took note that the jury found no express malice.201 And again, 
unlike Ruffin in Mann, he made a decision in keeping with the jury’s 
finding. He concluded: 
From the facts, I am satisfied, as a man, that in truth malice did 
not exist, and I see no law which compels me, as a Judge, to 
infer malice contrary to the truth. Unless there be malice, 
express or implied, the slaying is a felonious homicide, but it is 
not murder.202 
Ruffin was under no obligation in Mann to conclude that a 
master may shoot his slave who is fleeing from punishment. He had 
ample room to maneuver to a different result, not the least of which—
as Gaston observed—was affirming the jury verdict convicting Mann. 
When faced with similar legal choices involving a slave’s right to 
defend himself from undue punishment, Ruffin and Gaston made 
divergent decisions: Ruffin, in overruling the jury and meting out 
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harsh legal precedent, chose the short-sighted option. Gaston, on the 
other hand, chose wisely, using the humanity that unites us all—an 
idea surely inspired by his Catholic faith—as a means of justifying a 
more reasonable and fair outcome. 
Gaston’s decision in Negro Will was quickly lauded as an 
important case in undermining the foothold of slavery in the law, and 
Gaston himself was praised for his bravery and boldness. While 
opinions are often not recognized for their importance until decades 
later, Gaston’s opinion in Negro Will was acknowledged for its pivotal 
role in chipping away at the legal underpinnings of slavery as early as 
1893. While addressing the Supreme Court at the dedication of 
Gaston’s portrait, Mr. Fabius H. Busbee recognized the importance 
and essential humanity of Negro Will. Busbee stated: 
It is difficult for the present generations fully to appreciate the 
merits and the courage of the opinion in [Negro Will]. We must 
fully realize in our minds the condition of a slave-holding 
people. The fear of negro insurrection always vaguely 
apprehended, and ever and anon becoming an imminent danger 
or a dread reality, the necessity upon the part of those who 
administered the law to relax no proper rule of restraint, and at 
the same time the equal necessity of imposing some check upon 
the brutality of cruel masters or reckless overseers, the 
sensitiveness of the public mind upon the subject in its political 
as well as in its legal and social aspects, combined to render the 
task of laying down the law in this case one of extreme delicacy. 
The inherent evils of slavery, which it were worse than folly to 
deny, were fully understood by this humane slave-holder, and it 
was his high mission and earnest desire to mitigate every 
remediable hardship. This great opinion of Judge Gaston, in its 
clear analysis of the respective legal rights and duties of master 
and slave, its condemnation of the brutality too often shown 
towards the helpless, its sublime compassion for the hunted and 
terrified slave, sounded the keynote that never ceased to ring in 
North Carolina.203 
Busbee’s remarks bring to mind the words Gaston wrote to 
Reverend Monsignor James A. Ryder at Georgetown, regarding the 
challenges of being a member of his faith.204 Clearly, Gaston was 
familiar with being an outsider, and given his written expression of 
compassion, it should come as no surprise that he was able to view 
this case through a different lens than his contemporaries. 
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2.  State v. Manuel: Gaston Reemphasizes the Protections Afforded 
to Freemen as Citizens 
Several years later, Justice Gaston authored the opinion in State 
v. Manuel.205 In Manuel, Gaston addressed the issue of citizenship for 
free persons of color in North Carolina. Again, both his religion and 
his upbringing in New Bern likely influenced his view of the subject. 
He succinctly determined that 
[a]ccording to the laws of this State, all human beings within it 
who are not slaves, fall within one of two classes.	.	.	. Foreigners 
until made members of the State continued aliens. Slaves 
manumitted here become free-men—and, therefore, if born 
within North Carolina are citizens of North Carolina—and all 
free persons born within the State are born citizens of the 
State.206 
This straightforward analysis set the stage for the outcome in Manuel, 
as well as advancing Gaston’s argument for the end of slavery.207 
In Manuel, the precise legal issue before the court was whether 
the defendant—”a free person of colour”208—could be hired out 
based upon his inability to pay a fine.209 The term of service for the 
indebtedness was not to exceed five years, and the debtor’s 
relationship with the individual who hired him was to be under the 
same conditions as those required between master and apprentice.210 
William Manuel, the defendant, objected to the arrangement on 
constitutional grounds, arguing that the act conflicted with 
constitutional provisions that “protect[] the person of a debtor after 
ascertained insolvency from imprisonment for debt” as well as the 
provisions that prohibit excessive fines, the imposition of cruel or 
unusual punishment, and the “destruction or the deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property of a free-man otherwise than by the law of the 
land.”211 
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The Attorney General, arguing for the state, countered the 
constitutional argument was frivolous because the defendant was not 
a citizen of the state. Essentially, his argument was twofold: first, the 
Constitutional provisions “were designed exclusively for the benefit 
of those who were constituent members of that State,” and second, 
“persons of color, whether born free or emancipated from slavery, 
were not originally members of that political body and never since 
have been incorporated into it.”212 
The court rejected both arguments.213 Instead, Gaston wrote that 
the protections of the Constitution extended to all “citizens or 
foreigners dwelling amongst us.”214 He summarized: “[t]hey are so 
many safeguards against the violation of civil rights and operate for 
the advantage of all by whom these rights may be lawfully 
possessed.”215 Therefore, Justice Gaston concluded, the constitutional 
prohibition against the imprisonment of debtors applies to all—both 
citizens and foreigners—recognizing that both categories of persons 
are “entitled to liberty, and permitted the enjoyment of property.”216 
As he did in Negro Will, Gaston painted civil rights with a broad 
brush. Gaston reasoned that since “justice is the great object, highest 
duty and best interest of every community,” those who “ordained” 
the Constitution thought it necessary to “consecrate by their most 
solemn sanctions” certain fundamental principles and protect “any 
who might be entrusted under the Constitution” from violation 
thereof.217 He set out the rights afforded to “all prisoners,”218 and to 
“all men.”219 Gaston then employed a series of rhetorical questions 
leading to the inevitable conclusion that the Framers of the 
Constitution intended that these rights be afforded to all citizens.220 
His questions emphasized the Constitution’s “many safeguards 
against the violation of civil rights” which “operate for the advantage 
of all by whom these rights may be lawfully possessed.”221 Gaston 
concluded his general discussion of the Constitution and its objective 
as follows: “[n]o doubt, the primary purpose of the Constitution was 
the well being of the people, by whom it was ordained, and the 
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political powers reserved or granted thereby must be understood to 
be reserved or granted to that people collectively, or to the 
individuals of whom it was composed.”222 Gaston linked this primary 
purpose—protecting North Carolina’s citizens—with Constitutional 
provisions that Devereaux and Battle characterize as applying to both 
citizens and foreigners.223 
Gaston then dismissed the state’s argument that the defendant 
could not be afforded the protections of citizenship.224 To be fair, 
Gaston’s argument is a bit more expansive than is required, given that 
Manuel was a freeman; nonetheless, this is not surprising given the 
premium Gaston placed upon freedom. In 1835—after he wrote 
Negro Will, but prior to Manuel—Gaston gave a speech to the Whig 
and Cliosophic Literary Societies at Princeton, his alma mater.225 
There, he asserted that 
without freedom, man is a poor, miserable, abject thing, the 
sport and victim of his fellow man’s rage, caprice and cruelty, 
having neither vigour of thought, motive for exertion, nor 
rational hope to gratify. But there can be no freedom without 
law. Unrestrained liberty is anarchy; domination in the strong; 
slavery in the weak; outrage and plunder in the combined 
oppressors; helpless misery in the oppressed; insecurity, 
suspicion, distrust, and fear to all.226 
Given Gaston’s specific comments at Princeton and the general 
importance placed by his Catholic faith on human equality, it is not 
surprising that he then writes in Manuel the following: 
Upon the Revolution, no other change took place in the law of 
North Carolina, than was consequent upon the transition from 
a colony dependent on an European King to a free and 
sovereign State. Slaves remained slaves. British subjects in 
North Carolina became North Carolina free-men. Foreigners 
until made members of the State continued aliens. Slaves 
manumitted here become free-men—and therefore if born 
within North Carolina are citizens of North Carolina—and all 
free persons born within the State are born citizens of the 
State.227 
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Manuel remains significant in the pantheon of civil rights 
jurisprudence because of the importance of Gaston’s recognition of 
citizenship. Almost twenty years later, Justice Curtis’s dissenting 
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford228 mirrored Justice Gaston’s logic 
regarding the citizenship of freemen in North Carolina.229 Relying 
upon the reasoning employed by Justice Gaston, he stated that, in 
determining the citizenship status of free persons who descended 
from African slaves, the central inquiry was whether they were 
citizens of the States when the Articles of Confederation and 
Constitution were adopted. Curtis then concluded that free persons 
undoubtedly must be citizens because, upon adoption of the Articles 
of Confederation, free, native-born descendants of African slaves in 
many states—including North Carolina—were citizens, often with 
equal rights, including the right to vote.230 
While the defendant in Manuel ultimately lost, in the larger 
picture, Gaston’s inclusive interpretation of citizenship carried 
tremendous import.231 Writing early in the twentieth century, one 
commentator echoed Gaston, observing that upon independence, the 
law recognized two classes of people—”the slave and the free”—with 
only the free considered citizens and the slaves titled “other 
person[s]” by a Constitution unwilling to explicitly list slavery within 
its provisions.232 The refusal of the Framers to use the term slave in 
the founding text demonstrated their hope to, within their own time, 
end both slavery and class-based distinctions.233 In a footnote, the 
author cited Gaston’s discussion of emancipation in Manuel, which he 
stated depends on state regulations, whereas citizenship 
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naturalization was within the power of the federal government; 
furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Dred Scott, incorrectly 
confounded the two and ignored evidence that many freed slaves 
were citizens in many states, causing the decision to be incorrectly 
decided.234 Had the Dred Scott Court viewed “the removal of the 
incapacity of slavery”235 as conveying full citizenship—which Gaston 
appears to have done236—it would have been far more difficult to 
reach the conclusion that “enslaved people in the United States had 
never been entitled to citizenship,”237 “at precisely the moment that 
antislavery writers were advancing the citizenship rights of enslaved 
people.”238 
3.  State v. Jarrott: Gaston in Conflict 
Gaston’s analysis in State v. Jarrott,239 authored in 1840, sustains 
his reputation for progressive thought in protecting the civil rights of 
slaves in criminal trials. In Jarrott, the defendant slave was indicted 
for killing a young white man, Thomas Chatham.240 Jarrott was 
engaged in a card game with a freeman when a dispute arose between 
them over Jarrott’s money.241 During the dispute, Jarrott “told [the 
deceased] if he did not give it up, he would kill him—and brandished 
a stick over” his head.242 Even after retrieving his money, there was 
some evidence that Jarrott continued to verbally abuse the deceased, 
“using very indecent and insolent language towards him.”243 Chatham 
obtained a knife and threatened to “stick” Jarrott if he did not 
“hush.”244 Jarrott insulted the deceased and began chasing him until 
the deceased lunged at him with a knife in one hand and a rail in the 
other.245 Witnesses reported hearing two blows and subsequently 
finding the deceased on the ground.246 Several witnesses generally 
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confirmed this account, some noting that there was “a cessation in the 
quarrel, and that the deceased renewed it”; that Chatham was 
described variously “as small and slender for a boy of his age; 
and	.	.	.	as not tall, but stoutly built”;247 that Jarrott, in contrast, was 
described as “about six feet high, and of the ordinary size of negroes 
of that height”;248 and that Jarrott had not shaken a stick over the 
deceased’s head.249 One witness said that the deceased “swore he 
would kill the prisoner that night,” or, in the alternative, would have 
Jarrott’s master whip him Monday morning “to his satisfaction,” and 
“then waylay him and shoot him with a rifle.”250 
On these facts, Jarrott’s counsel made four requests of the trial 
judge. First, “to instruct the jury, ‘[t]hat, in trials affecting life, a negro 
slave should not be convicted of murder, unless a white man would be 
convicted on the same evidence.’	”251 Second, that if the jury believed 
the deceased stole from Jarrott, “the deceased had no right to strike 
the prisoner, for insulting language, in consequence of it; and in that 
aspect of the case, the prisoner was entitled to be regarded as a white 
man on this trial.”252 Third, if the deceased struck Jarrott with the rail 
prior to the deceased striking Jarrott with his stick, that it was then “a 
case of mutual combat; and although the prisoner might have courted 
the conflict, the killing would be only manslaughter.”253And, finally, 
“[t]hat the deceased had no right to correct the prisoner, with the 
piece of rail or the knife, for insolent language; but ought to have 
applied to his master, or to a justice of the peace, for redress.”254 The 
trial court declined all four requested instructions, instead charging 
the jury as follows: 
[I]f the prisoner used the insolent language, to the deceased, 
deposed to by the witnesses, the deceased had a right to correct 
him, although such language was used by the prisoner, upon the 
supposition that the deceased had stolen his money. That if 
they were satisfied that the prisoner used the provoking 
language, to the deceased, as stated by the witnesses, the 
deceased had a right to whip him; and if, in the exercise of this 
right, the prisoner killed him, it would be murder, unless the 
prisoner had good reason to believe that the deceased would 
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kill him, or do him some great bodily harm. And, for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether the prisoner had good reason 
to apprehend death, or great bodily harm, at the hands of the 
deceased, it was proper for them to take into consideration the 
comparative size and bodily powers of the parties, and their 
weapons. That if the prisoner had good reason to apprehend 
either death or great bodily harm, it would extenuate the killing 
to manslaughter; but if not, it would be murder.255 
Jarrott was subsequently found guilty of murder.256 
Writing for the court on appeal, Justice Gaston determined that 
the trial judge did not err in refusing to give the first two of the four 
requested instructions.257 He began by stating, “[i]t is not questioned 
but that the prisoner was entitled to the benefit of all those humane 
principles of the common law, which, in indulgence to the frailties of 
human nature, extenuate the guilt of homicide from murder to 
manslaughter.”258 However, Gaston was unwilling to extend the same 
latitude to a slave as to a white man. Despite his usually progressive 
philosophy, Gaston declined to view the deceased—a white man—
and Jarrott—a slave—as equals under the law.259 
In rejecting Jarrott’s first requested jury instruction, Gaston 
stated that the principles must be applied differently due to the “vast 
difference which exists” between the social conditions of whites and 
slaves.260 This difference made what might be the “grossest 
degradation” to one only a “slight injury” to the other.261 Therefore, 
Gaston believed that what amounted to a provocation for a white 
person would not necessarily a provocation for a slave, “whose 
passions are, or ought to be tamed down to his lowly condition.”262 
Gaston reasoned that these common law principles were merely 
adjusted to “the actual conditions of human beings in our society.”263 
It is admittedly difficult to reconcile this harsh language with the far 
more open-minded Gaston of Negro Will and Manuel.264 Although 
there he was willing to extend legal protections to enslaved persons 
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and free blacks, as a man of the early nineteenth century, it seems he 
still could not view them as equals here by virtue of their race. 
As to the second instruction, Gaston stayed with the same theme, 
noting “the difference of condition between the white man and the 
slave—as recognized by our legal institutions—and not the difference 
between personal merit and demerit—which creates a legal 
distinction between the sufficiency and insufficiency of the alleged 
provocation.”265 He also relies on the familiar “safety” argument, 
notably used by Daniel arguing in Negro Will:266 “[t]his distinction, 
therefore, must be as broad as that difference, or it would not only be 
unsuited to the state of our society—and incompatible with the 
subordination of ranks essential to the safety of the State—but would 
be too vague to be admissible as a legal rule.”267 Gaston continued on 
to state, “the distinction of castes yet remains, and with it remain all 
the passions, infirmities, and habits, which grow out of this 
distinction.”268 Here, although Gaston acknowledged that the 
deceased may have been inferior to Jarrott as a human being, he was 
still hesitant to upset the social order of the day as to this portion of 
Jarrott’s appeal. 
With respect to the fourth requested jury instruction, Gaston 
held that the trial judge did err by refusing to give this instruction.269 
Gaston noted that in State v. Hale,270 the court held “that the battery 
of a slave, by any other than his master, was per se a public offence; 
but, at the same time it was declared that, such a battery might be 
justified	.	.	.	by circumstances which would form no justification for 
the battery of a white man.”271 In Hale, the court had wrestled with 
defining those circumstances, determining it was “impossible to do so 
with precision.”272 Here again, the court reverted to the need to avoid 
a “breach of the public peace, ‘under the habits and feelings of 
society, securing at the same time the white [man] from injury and 
insult, and the slave from needless violence and outrage.’	”273 Gaston 
expressed that the court felt bound to hold that excessive battery 
against the slave was not justified in the present case.274 
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Holding that an assault of this nature is an attempt to commit an 
excessive battery, Gaston emphasized that the instruments 
brandished by the deceased—a three-inch knife and fence railing—
were unlawful tools for a master to use to “correct insolence.”275 
Gaston acknowledged that the trial court’s directive acknowledging 
the right of the deceased to “whip” Jarrott under verbal provocation 
would be correct under this framework; however, Gaston explained 
that a whipping with a piece of fence rail, as the witnesses testified, 
would be unlawful.276 
Gaston then questioned the amount and extent of Jarrott’s 
verbal provocations, and whether they ceased prior to Chatham 
attacking him.277 Gaston declared that such factual determinations 
were within the province of the jury.278 Relying again upon Hale, 
Gaston concluded his discussion of the matter by noting that it is 
unnecessary for a person who is injured by a slave to carry out their 
own justice. He emphasized that “the law has made ample and 
summary provision for the punishment of all trivial offenses 
committed by slaves, by carrying them before a Justice, who is 
authorised to pass sentence for their being publicly whipped.”279 His 
holding intended not only to remove the necessity of private 
vengeance, but also to “forbid its legality” by effectively protecting all 
people from slave misbehavior.280 
This statement afforded a broad protection for all slaves—
perhaps more so than the precedents upon which Gaston relied. The 
statement is also characteristic of Gaston’s approach in both Negro 
Will and Manuel. In each of these cases, Gaston subtly shifts the bar 
forward, providing more legal protection for North Carolina’s slave 
population. This shift ultimately is in keeping with the Catholic 
emphasis on human equality. By gradually granting more legal 
protections to slaves, Gaston helped to advance slaves to a position of 
equality in society’s eyes. Though equality would not be substantially 
achieved until many decades later, the legal underpinnings laid here 
by Gaston accelerated the process. 
Finally, Gaston addressed the third jury instruction given by the 
trial judge. This third instruction—that “where parties become 
suddenly heated, and engage immediately in mortal conflict, fighting 
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upon equal terms, and one killeth the other,” the case is one of 
manslaughter281—was the rule of law in a dispute between two white 
men.282 Gaston determined that Jarrott did not fall within that rule 
because of his status as a slave.283 Therefore, the case was remanded 
and Jarrott was awarded a new trial.284 Although much of Gaston’s 
jurisprudence substantially advanced the cause of those who were 
enslaved, this portion of Jarrott demonstrates that even he was limited 
by the time in which he lived. 
Read together, Gaston’s jurisprudence demonstrates a sensitivity 
to North Carolina’s slave population that does not exist in the 
writings of his peers. He understood “that the judicial resolution of 
conflicts must be guided by ‘[j]ustice, which it is the first object of 
every well-regulated society to establish, and the repose of the 
community, an object second only in importance to justice.’	”285 It 
would be fair to conclude that Gaston sought “maximum justice for 
slaves,”286 while adhering to acceptable legal norms.287 Any judge has 
enormous discretion to influence the jurisprudence in his jurisdiction. 
Of course, if he serves on a multi-member court, he must persuade his 
colleagues of the legitimacy of his opinions. Gaston’s background as a 
very successful legislator is additional evidence of his ability to bring 
his colleagues along to his way of thinking. Chief Justice Ruffin, who 
authored Mann in 1830, signed on to Negro Will a scant four years 
later. By pushing back against this recent precedent, Gaston 
masterfully negotiated the boundaries of his office. 
Gaston’s objective is also consistent with the Catholic view 
emphasizing human equality. Both his writings288 and his public 
addresses289 make clear both the depth of his fidelity to his faith and 
his strong views in opposition to slavery. The nexus between these 
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two can be seen in the cases he authored, which afforded both slaves 
and free blacks a measure of compassion that generally had been 
absent from the case law. 
CONCLUSION 
On the occasion of Justice Gaston’s death, many testimonials 
were published throughout North Carolina. One of these, “read by 
representatives of the black community of New Bern	.	.	.	gives ample 
evidence of the esteem in which he was held among them.”290 It 
stated: 
Judge Gaston was an example in word and conversation, in 
spirit and purity. He was a friend of the widow and the orphan. 
He was a kind and indulgent master—the most of his servants 
can read and write, the consequence is they are a most 
intelligent set of people. Judge Gaston was a friend of 
emancipation, he not only emancipated several of his own 
people, but he bought others and set them free. He was a 
Christian in deed and truth; his religion was not a thing of form 
and decencies, it was a pervading principle that entered into all 
his concerns, all his thoughts and all his hopes.291 
That extraordinary testimony, coming from the free African 
American community, exemplifies the sophisticated ideas about 
justice and law that circulated in North Carolina before the Civil War. 
It also invites further, deep investigation of that community that 
parallels the recent research into the free African American 
communities in Virginia in the pre-Civil War era.292 
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The New Bern freed people clearly paid close attention to the 
role of judges in framing the law that governed them and their 
enslaved brethren. This suggests the important role that Justice 
Gaston played in the formation of slave jurisprudence.293 Thomas 
Ruffin, a Democrat, had a vision that property owners should have 
uncontrolled authority over the body of their enslaved property.294 
That was seen most clearly in Ruffin’s Mann decision.295 Following 
extensive criticism296 and the ascension of William Gaston to the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina, both Ruffin and the Court 
moderated that extreme view.297 
In an address to the state agricultural society in 1855, one 
commentator observed that Ruffin viewed slavery as a “not pure and 
unmixed good” and truly believed instances of great severity in 
punishment were an exception to the otherwise moderate treatment 
of slaves. Characterizing Ruffin’s view of slavery as “humane” and 
mutually beneficial to both slave and slaveholder, this commentator 
reinforced Ruffin’s idealized view of slavery in which the slaveholder 
and the enslaved had “a perfect knowledge of each other, and a 
mutual attachment.”298 The commentator inferred from Ruffin’s 
address that Ruffin believed “good slaves obeyed because they were 
protected and cared for, not because they were subject to the absolute 
power of their masters.”299 
The commentator made a similar observation of Gaston based 
on an undated, unpublished writing contained within his papers. He 
concluded, “Judge Gaston	.	.	.	spoke with the same voice.”300 In 
support of this statement, he cited the following: 
It is difficult to imagine a state of slavery to exist more 
mitigated than that which prevails in North Carolina	.	.	.	. 
Slavery is regarded as an evil not to be removed, but as 
susceptible of mitigation. The Laws are continually contributing 
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to this result—but public opinion and enlightened self interest 
contribute far more efficaciously.301 
The difficulty in juxtaposing these two statements, though, is that we 
have a date and a place for Justice Ruffin’s address, and are therefore 
able to put it into context; however, Justice Gaston’s is an undated 
writing, providing no ability to evaluate when he had these thoughts 
or whether he had made them publicly known. Through Justice 
Gaston’s published writing, we see—on multiple occasions—how his 
approach to and repudiation of slavery are the opposite of what is 
described by the commentator. Moreover, Gaston’s death had to be 
recognized as a significant loss, “reduc[ing] the influence of those who 
sought to ameliorate conditions for enslaved and free blacks.”302 It is 
simply impossible to read both Mann, authored by Ruffin, and Negro 
Will, authored by Gaston, and conclude that they spoke with the same 
voice. 
Justice Gaston’s isolated writing on the relatively “mitigated” 
institution of slavery stands in stark contrast to his well-publicized 
condemnation of the institution of slavery in his address at the 
University of North Carolina303—an address well over twenty years 
before the Ruffin address to a very different audience. It may suggest 
that Gaston—like the fictional Judge Clayton in Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s novel Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp304—
understood the economic and demographic reality that slavery would 
not end in North Carolina voluntarily. It may also suggest that what 
hope there was would have to come from the gradual warming of 
public sentiment towards decent treatment of enslaved people. 
Nonetheless, we do know that Gaston, like Ruffin, was a slaveholder, 
owning approximately 160 slaves at the time of his death.305 There is 
no evidence that he took any extraordinary steps to manumit these 
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individuals, even though he had assisted others in doing so during his 
legal career, and had freed at least a few people during his life.306 
Gaston’s jurisprudence, though, was a departure from Ruffin’s. 
By holding Gaston in contrast with Ruffin and by focusing on his 
religious beliefs, this Article links Gaston’s morality with his 
jurisprudence. He remained committed to the universality of the law; 
everyone—including slaveowners—were subject to its tenets. His 
analysis injected empathy and some sense of humanity into the 
prosecution of enslaved people, recognizing the very human reactions 
that they—or anyone—would have when their lives were threatened. 
In the face of concerns among the slaveowning community about the 
very real threat of slave rebellion, Gaston’s religion-inspired 
jurisprudence cabined violence against slaves and reduced legal 
retribution against those slaves who resisted extreme punishment by 
their owners. This helps us see Gaston as an extraordinary jurist, 
whose work mitigated the brutality of slavery. Thus, he appears as an 
answer to Robert Cover’s condemnation of anti-slavery jurists who 
operated in a pro-slavery world.307 He incrementally bent the law 
towards justice for all, which was the best that could be accomplished 
only by the boldest of judges in the antebellum period. Where Ruffin 
had the choice in Mann to accept a jury verdict that was favorable to 
treatment of slaves, he rejected it.308 In contrast, Gaston moved the 
law forward on several occasions in favor of expansion of civil rights 
for slaves.309 His writings make clear his devotion to his faith, an 
important distinction between the two men. Gaston was, in many 
ways, a man of his time; however, in so many ways, he courageously 
far exceeded his time. 
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